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Active Judicial Governance 
JAMES A. GARDNER*  
INTRODUCTION 
ver a long career, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
often presented himself as a populist deflator of the pompous. 
One of his favorite targets was judges, whom Scalia seemed to 
believe held an excessively high and unjustified opinion of themselves. Like 
his former D.C. Circuit colleague Robert Bork, who famously described 
judges as “lawyers in robes,”1 Scalia liked to remind judges that they were 
nothing more than everyday attorneys who happened to have been 
appointed to the bench. The transition in employment from lawyer to judge, 
he liked to imply, added nothing to their intelligence or wisdom. The 
Supreme Court itself was for Scalia merely “a committee of nine unelected 
lawyers”2 whose members knew the answers to difficult questions no better 
than “nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone 
directory.”3 
While in a democracy there is always something satisfying about seeing 
the mighty taken down a peg, this view of judges is highly disingenuous. 
Calling judges “lawyers in robes” is a bit like calling the President of the 
United States an ordinary citizen with a nuclear arsenal; the observation may 
be true in a sense, but that sense is largely irrelevant, for an ordinary citizen 
who holds the officially granted power to launch a nuclear strike is, by virtue 
of holding that power, far from ordinary. It is of course often true that 
individual judges have no greater wisdom or intelligence than other 
people—though in a well-functioning system of judicial selection perhaps 
they ought to—but that’s not the point. Judges, regardless of their 
* Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Law
School, State University of New York. 
1  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 252 
(1990). 
2  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
3  Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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intelligence and wisdom, are, in virtue of being judges, government officials. 
In that role, as members of one of three co-equal branches of government, 
they govern. To be sure, judges do not govern alone—they do so in concert 
with the legislative and executive branches—but they nonetheless share the 
burden of governance. That is what makes them more than lawyers in robes. 
Professor Jonathan Marshfield’s excellent new paper, Courts and Informal 
Constitutional Change in the States,4 provides suggestive, but nevertheless 
impressive, evidence that state high court judges—contrary to the view 
expressed by Justice Scalia—both recognize and embrace their role as active 
participants in the processes of democratic self-governance. This is not to say 
that they lack humility; it is to say merely that they seem to possess a 
different and more nuanced understanding of the role of courts in American 
government than some of their federal counterparts. 
I. 
Marshfield’s subject is constitutional change—the means and 
mechanisms, both formal and informal, by which constitutions change their 
meaning and operation.5 His project is to test empirically a proposition of 
received wisdom holding that the difficulty of formal constitutional 
amendment and the frequency of informal constitutional change are 
inversely related.6 This proposition assumes that demand for change 
eventually builds up in any constitutional system, and that this demand is 
more likely to be satisfied through formal processes of constitutional 
amendment when formal amendment is relatively easy. When formal 
amendment is difficult, the demand for constitutional change is more likely 
to be satisfied through informal means, such as judicial reinterpretation7 or 
changes in official practice.8 
Marshfield puts this proposition to the test by painstakingly examining 
the entire corpus of state supreme court decisions over a thirty-five-year 
period, looking for instances in which courts have overruled their own prior 
decisions in cases construing the state constitution.9 Although informal 
constitutional change can occur in many ways, and such change can 
sometimes be hard to detect, judicial overrulings provide indisputable 
4  See generally Jonathan L. Marshfield, Courts and Informal Constitutional Change in the States, 
52 New. Eng. L. Rev. 453 (2017). 
5  See generally id. 
6  Id. at 460–61. 
7  The best-known account of this kind of change is undoubtedly 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE (1991). 
8
 See generally James A. Gardner, Practice-Driven Changes to Constitutional Structures of 
Governance, 69 ARK. L. REV. 335 (2016). 
9  Marshfield, supra note 4, at 460–61. 
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evidence of informal constitutional change because a court is openly 
changing its own interpretation of a constitutional provision. 
Marshfield’s findings are surprising. State constitutions are, by and 
large, far easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution,10 suggesting that 
demand for constitutional change at the state level should be satisfied much 
more commonly by formal than by informal amendment. Although state 
constitutions have indeed undergone frequent formal amendment, 
Marshfield finds that they also have been amended informally, through 
judicial overruling, with great frequency.11 He thus identifies a significant 
flaw in the received wisdom, requiring scholars to rethink their 
understanding of the drivers of constitutional change. 
II. 
Before turning to the implications of Marshfield’s study, I want to 
mention briefly its limitations. I stress that these limitations in no way 
undermine the force of the study. Marshfield is well aware of and openly 
acknowledges these limitations; and the limitations suggest not that the 
study is doubtful, but quite the opposite—that it greatly underestimates the 
strength of the very interesting phenomenon it persuasively identifies. 
The main shortcoming of the study is a consequence of its 
methodology—by examining only explicit judicial overruling of prior 
decisional law, the study very likely grossly underestimates the extent of 
informal judicial amendment of state constitutions. Explicit judicial 
overruling of prior decisions is a comparatively rare event in any court, 
including state supreme courts. American constitutional law is usefully and, 
in my view, accurately conceived as subject to development through a 
methodology much like common law adjudication.12 This technique, which 
allows courts to develop the law by distinguishing and reinterpreting 
precedent, gives courts the flexibility to alter constitutional doctrine 
incrementally, without resorting to direct and formal overruling. Moreover, 
because overruling is generally disfavored, many overrulings are 
surreptitious, and therefore not expressly announced. Any attempt to 
measure the extent of informal constitutional change resulting from judicial 
reinterpretation by including only express overruling is therefore highly 
likely to underestimate its incidence in the relevant decisional law. Indeed, I 
would venture to guess that the body of decisional law altering the meaning 
of state constitutions through common law and surreptitious overruling 
dwarfs the body of case law in which courts openly announce what they are 
doing. Thus, Marshfield’s study, though commendable for its validity and 
10  G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 34–37 (1998). 
11  Marshfield, supra note 4, at 493–502. 
12  See generally DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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reproducibility, very likely understates dramatically the extent of informal 
constitutional change on the state level. 
A second shortcoming of the study is that the case selection method, by 
confining itself to explicit overrulings, biases the results in favor of areas of 
state constitutional law with a substantial preexisting jurisprudence. As 
anyone who has studied American subnational constitutional law well 
knows, there is a great deal of variation across the subject matter of state 
constitutions in the extent to which provisions of state constitutions have 
been subject to judicial construction.13 Because state courts are the main 
workhorses of the criminal law, state constitutional provisions relating to 
criminal procedure are often thoroughly and extensively construed, with 
substantial bodies of local decisional law.14 But many parts of state 
constitutions, often including structural and fiscal provisions, remain 
surprisingly underdeveloped by judicial interpretation. In those areas, any 
judicial intervention at all has the capacity to make an informal adjustment 
to the state constitution, but this will not be reflected in overrulings because 
there is little or no prior case law on point to overrule. This may help explain 
Marshfield’s findings of a low incidence of overrulings in areas like 
constitutional structure and tax, which are often jurisprudentially 
underdeveloped. Controlling for the distribution of cases on judicial dockets 
would thus likely have made the study more accurate. 
III. 
These minor quibbles notwithstanding, Marshfield’s study provides 
convincing evidence of an important fact: state high court judges participate 
actively and routinely in the processes of public governance, and they do so 
more openly and, apparently, with greater comfort and confidence than 
their federal counterparts. 
It is easy to understand how legislatures and executives govern. 
Legislatures enact laws. Executives implement and enforce them. These are 
highly visible actions on a very public stage, and the actions of legislatures 
and executives often have immediate effects on the public at large. Courts, 
in contrast, often operate quietly outside the public eye. They spend a great 
deal of their time resolving disputes among private individuals. Unlike 
legislators and presidents or governors—who not only are free to pursue 
overtly partisan goals, but are elected precisely to do so—judges must act 
impartially, never prejudging, but treating equally all views presented to 
them as presumptively of equal validity, until proven wrong by evidence 
and the force of better argument. As a result, it is sometimes difficult to see 
13  See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 
780–81 (1991). 
14  See generally, e.g., BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1995). 
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just how courts participate in the process of governance. Yet courts do 
participate in governance, and they are capable of doing so quite actively, 
though typically more intermittently than the other branches. 
In the most straightforward sense, courts govern in a way not so 
different from the other branches—they exercise official judgment for the 
public good. That is, when confronted with a question of law that must be 
answered in order to resolve a specific case before them, judges are obliged, 
in cases where they have discretion, to exercise their judgment about the 
meaning of the law in a way that conduces to the public good.15 This 
obligation applies to the construction of any kind of law, but clearly has its 
most urgent application in cases requiring construction of the constitution, 
which, as the fundamental law of the state, affects the greatest number of 
people on the greatest number of occasions. 
In some quarters, to be sure, the exercise of this kind of judicial judgment 
is often disparaged as judicial activism—alas, a highly politicized term in 
today’s partisan discourse.16 At the federal level, arguments against the 
validity of judicial activism do not, however, deny that judges labor under 
an obligation, in cases where they have discretion, to choose from among 
decisional options those outcomes that are most fully consistent with the 
public good. Instead, opponents of judicial activism tend to deny that judges 
have discretion. Originalism, for example, proceeds from the premise that 
the U.S. Constitution provides clear, concrete answers to virtually any 
conceivable question about its meaning, thereby depriving judges of any 
discretion in construing it.17 Federal judges, in the words of Chief Justice 
John Roberts, merely “call balls and strikes”;18 they are passive observers of 
objective phenomena. 
State judges, however, have long been said to operate in a different 
jurisprudential environment than their federal counterparts, one that helps 
to alleviate concerns about their exercise of active judgment in matters 
concerning the common good. First, many state judges are elected, giving 
them a direct democratic pedigree that appointed federal judges lack, and 
making them democratically accountable to the public should their 
15  For example, an ancient principle of statutory construction requires courts to construe 
statutes so as to avoid absurd consequences. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486–
87 (1868).  
16  See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2006). 
17  The locus classicus is Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). More recent versions of originalism may be more congenial to the 
possibility that constitutional meaning may be sufficiently indeterminate in some domains to 
require the exercise of some judicial discretion. See e.g., Andrew Coan, Living Constitutional 
Theory, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 99 (2017). 
18  Roberts: “My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,” CNN (Sept. 12, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/W5TT-SJWV. 
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judgments stray too far from what the electorate considers acceptable.19 
Second, because state supreme court judges construe the law only for the 
polity of a single state, the stakes are lower. When the U.S. Supreme Court 
issues a constitutional ruling, the ruling applies uniformly across the nation. 
The lesser impact of state judicial rulings might thus legitimately prompt 
state judges to feel more comfortable experimenting with constitutional 
doctrine.20 
A second way in which state courts participate in governance is 
captured in dialogic theories of how the law develops.21 Such theories make 
both a descriptive and a normative claim. Descriptively, dialogic theories 
contend that the routine processes of government create a kind of cross-
dialogue among governmental actors. For example, when a state legislature 
enacts a law, it may simultaneously initiate a dialogue among all three 
branches of state government about the merits of the law. The process might 
start when the governor vetoes it, explaining his objections. The legislature 
might then reconsider the law, taking into account the governor’s objections, 
prompting him to sign the law. A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality 
of the law might then ensue. The state supreme court might invalidate the 
law on constitutional grounds, explain its reasoning, and send the law back 
to the legislature for further consideration in light of constitutional concerns. 
Eventually, the process may yield a law that takes into account adequately 
the different considerations that all three branches of government are 
charged with protecting. 
As a descriptive matter, state courts also often participate in dialogue 
with courts in other jurisdictions. Although every state constitution is 
different, they contain many similarities—for example, all protect certain 
fundamental rights, and in many cases those rights protections are similar 
to ones contained in the Federal Bill of Rights. State courts called upon to 
construe provisions of their own state constitutions thus often find it useful 
to examine how other state courts have handled similar problems under 
their own constitutions. This kind of cross-jurisdictional consultation occurs 
even across the federal-state boundary: state courts are routinely influenced 
19  JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION
IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 211–12 (2005). 
20  See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of 
Supreme Court Reasoning and Results, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 396 (1984) (“state courts, by definition, 
are not subject to the same federalism concerns[,]” i.e., concerns arising from the nationwide 
uniformity imposed by ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
21  See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1147, 1147–48 (1993); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New 
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 95–97 (2000). 
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by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,22 and vice versa.23 
But the most significant claim of dialogic theories is normative: they 
argue that this kind of interinstitutional dialogue benefits the entire system 
because it leads officials to learn from one another. This learning, in turn, 
ideally may precipitate an eventual system-wide convergence on the best 
solutions to common problems. Indeed, the results may be even more 
profound; as Lawrence Sager has argued, this process of dialogue may lead 
to “moral progress” when state courts “make the benefits of their moral 
imagination available to the nation.”24 In other words, when enterprising 
state courts experiment with constitutional implementation of previously 
unrecognized constitutional principles, other states observe the experiment 
from afar, and then embrace it if it proves successful. Eventually, the federal 
government itself may come around. This is, without a doubt, the story of 
the rapid adoption in the United States of constitutional protection for sex 
and marriage among gays and lesbians.25 
A third way in which state courts participate in governance is by 
participating in processes of subnational monitoring of national power.26 
The basic premise of our federal system is that power is divided to prevent 
any official from accumulating power so concentrated as to present a risk of 
tyranny.27 This division of power is maintained through a process of mutual 
checking in which the state and federal governments monitor the behavior 
of officials at the other level and, when necessary, deploy their own power 
to check and resist abuses.28 Courts may take an active role in this dynamic 
by using their role as superintendents of subnational constitutional law to 
register approval or disapproval of national jurisprudential trends.29 This 
occurs most commonly when the federal and state constitutions provide 
duplicative protection for the same fundamental rights. When the Supreme 
Court issues a ruling that, in the opinion of state court judges, construes a 
federally protected right too narrowly, state judges may publicly register 
their disapproval by construing a similar provision of the state constitution 
22  This influence is often said to be excessive, and has been criticized as a form of 
inappropriate lockstep interpretation. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 193–232 (2009). 
23  See GARDNER, supra note 19, at 104–10. 
24  Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, in NEW FRONTIERS
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17, 18 (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2011). 
25  See GARDNER, supra note 19, at 100–03, 106; Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take 
Consequences Into Account: Towards a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1630–34 (2010).  
26  See GARDNER, supra note 19, at 180–227. 
27  James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, N.Y. Packet, Feb. 1, 1788. 
28  See James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, N.Y. Packet, Feb. 8, 1788. 
29  GARDNER, supra note 19, at 186–98. 
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to provide broader protection. Again, this kind of very public objection to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence was instrumental in convincing the Supreme 
Court to reverse its ruling upholding the constitutionality of criminal 
punishment of gay sex.30 On the other hand, when state courts approve of 
the direction of the Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence, it is equally open 
to them to register their approval by following the Supreme Court’s lead 
when construing cognate provisions of the state constitution.31 
IV. 
The evidence presented by Professor Marshfield provides support, in 
some degree, for all of these hypotheses. The role of state courts as 
thoughtful servants of the public good, for example, is illustrated by the 
structural and tax cases described by Professor Marshfield.32 In these cases, 
state courts confront technical issues of lower court jurisdiction, separation 
of powers, and the scope of the charitable tax deduction, clearly grappling 
with difficult questions concerning how the public good can best be served 
where constitutional constraints apply in circumstances that have changed 
considerably since the adoption of the provisions under consideration.33 For 
example, in People v. Banta, the Colorado Supreme Court chose to overrule 
prospectively its prior decisional law limiting the power of the governor to 
make interim appointments to executive offices.34 The court reached this 
decision because it became convinced that its prior approach may cause, 
rather than prevent, impasse situations;35 the prior rule, in other words, did 
not serve the public good, requiring adoption of a different rule. 
Similarly, the process of governance through intrajurisdictional 
dialogue is well-illustrated by Del Rio v. Crake.36 That case concerned the 
constitutionality of a Hawaii law implementing a system of no-fault 
automobile insurance, in part by limiting the ability of injured motorists to 
file tort actions against other drivers. In an earlier pair of cases, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court had invalidated certain applications of the no-fault scheme 
on the grounds that they violated the equal protection provision of the state 
constitution.37 The legislature responded by re-enacting the statute, but with 
30  GARDNER, supra note 19, at 107–08. 
31  GARDNER, supra note 19, at 180–272. 
32  See Marshfield, supra note 4, at 515–17. 
33  See Marshfield, supra note 4, at 515–17. 
34  People v. Banta, 542 P.2d 377, 381 (Colo. 1975). 
35  Id. 
36  See Marshfield, supra note 4, at 511–13. See generally Del Rio v. Crake, 955 P.2d 90 (Haw. 
1998). 
37  Marshfield, supra note 4, at 511–12. 
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an expanded and more explicit legislative history clarifying its intent.38 In 
Del Rio, the court considered this new communication from the legislature 
and, while carefully reserving for itself final decision on the meaning of the 
state constitution, decided nevertheless to overrule its prior interpretation of 
the equal protection provision.39 Interbranch dialogue thus precipitated a 
change in prevailing constitutional doctrine. 
Finally, the evidence adduced by Marshfield also supports the 
proposition that state courts sometimes participate in active governance by 
monitoring and either pushing back against or approving federal rulings 
construing rights accorded duplicate protection at both levels. The tangled 
history of the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy40 well illustrates this 
dynamic. 
The double jeopardy clauses of the U.S. and Michigan Constitutions are 
worded in virtually identical terms.41 Although the two provisions bear no 
necessary relationship, and Michigan courts are free to interpret them to 
have different meanings,42 the Michigan Supreme Court until 1973 
interpreted the state double jeopardy clause in the same way as the U.S. 
Supreme Court interpreted its federal counterpart.43 In 1973, however, the 
Michigan Supreme Court became dissatisfied with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
handling of double jeopardy cases. Persuaded by a concurring opinion by 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan in Ashe v. Swenson44 criticizing 
the prevailing federal approach, the Michigan court overruled its prior 
decisional law and adopted in its place an analysis advocated by Brennan.45 
Three decades later, the Michigan court again overruled itself, this time 
returning to the prevailing standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court,46 
and noting that “[i]n recent years, this Court has looked generally to federal 
double jeopardy jurisprudence in determining whether the successive 
38  See Marshfield, supra note 4, at 512. 
39  See Marshfield, supra note 4, at 512. 
40  Marshfield, supra note 4, at 504–05. 
41  The federal clause provides, “nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Michigan clause provides, “No 
person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.” Mich. Const. art. I, § 
15. 
42  See generally Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 379, 392 (1980). 
43  People v. Nutt, 677 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 2004) (citing People v. Bigge, 297 N.W. 70, 73 
(Mich. 1941)). 
44  397 U.S. 436, 448–70 (1970). 
45  People v. White, 212 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Mich. 1973). 
46  Nutt, 677 N.W.2d at 15. 
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prosecutions strand of our Double Jeopardy Clause bars a prosecution.”47 
Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court has swung between expressing its 
approval of federal doctrine by adopting it under the state constitution; and 
expressing its disapproval of federal doctrine by loudly and ostentatiously 
criticizing and deviating from it in construing its own constitutional 
provision. In so doing, the court has engaged in active governance by 
successively endorsing, pushing back against, and re-endorsing the exercise 
of power by the federal judicial branch. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Marshfield presents his study as casting doubt on a long-held 
belief among constitutional scholars concerning the dynamics of 
constitutional change. In that, he has succeeded. But his study, it seems to 
me, shows something more—it reveals a state judiciary that, unlike its 
federal counterpart, conceives of state courts as active participants in 
constitutional governance. State courts, in his account, attempt assiduously 
to do their jobs in ways that promote the public good; they engage other 
branches of government and other judicial systems in useful and potentially 
beneficial dialogue; and they participate in the dynamic process of 
monitoring; and, when necessary, resist uses of federal power with which 
they disagree. State courts thus share with the other branches of state 
government, actively and without apology, a conception of their role as 
requiring them to do their best to produce the best possible results for their 
bosses, the people of the states. 
47  Id. at 13. 
